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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order, entered May 9,2012, from the 
Second Judicial District Court, Farmington Department. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)0"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellee is 
entitled to summary judgment in spite of, and apparently ignoring, a deemed admission 
that raised a material dispute of fact? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 1: Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "An appellate court 
reviews a [lower] court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jones & Trevor Mktg. v. 
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Lowiy, 2012 UT 39, P9 (Utah 2012) (quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1j 6, 177 P.3d 
600 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c) provides that "any matter admitted under this rule is 
conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of 
the admission." The court may permit withdrawal or amendment only "on motion" and 
only "if the presentation of the merits of the action will be promoted and withdrawal or 
amendment will not prejudice the requesting party." Id. Where a party makes no effort to 
have the admissions amended or withdrawn, "ftjhe trial court does not have discretion to 
unilaterally disregard the admissions." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 
1060 (Utah 1988) (emphasis in original); see also Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., 702 P.2d 
98,100 (Utah 1985); Whitaker v. Nikols. 699 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Utah 1985); Kotterv. 
Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, 639-640 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). Where a party does not make 
proper independent efforts to excuse itself from the effects of Rule 36, the matters 
contained in the request for admissions "are conclusively deemed admitted." Whitaker, 
699 P.2d at 687. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 1: This issue was preserved below in Kevin 
Kendall's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
118-119) and in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based on Deemed Admissions (R. 63, 65-69). 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err by not requiring the withdrawal 
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or amendment of the deemed admissions before granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 2: Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "An appellate court 
reviews a [lower] court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jones & Trevor MJztg. v. 
Lowry, 2012 UT 39, P9 (Utah 2012) (quoting Oms v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 111 P.3d 
600 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c) provides that "any matter admitted under this rule is 
conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of 
the admission.55 The court may permit withdrawal or amendment only "on motion55 and 
only "if the presentation of the merits of the action will be promoted and withdrawal or 
amendment will not prejudice the requesting party.55 Id. Where a party makes no effort to 
have the admissions amended or withdrawn, "ftjhe trial court does not have discretion to 
unilaterally disregard the admissions'" Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 
1060 (Utah 1988) (emphasis in original); see also Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., 702 P.2d 
98,100 (Utah 1985); Whitaker v. Nikols. 699 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Utah 1985); Kotterv. 
Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, 639-640 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). Where a party does not make 
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proper independent efforts to excuse itself from the effects of Rule 36, the matters 
contained in the request for admissions "are conclusively deemed admitted." Whitaker. 
699 P.2d at 687. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 2: This issue was preserved below in Kevin 
Kendall's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
118-119) and in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based on Deemed Admissions (R. 63, 65-69). 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 3; Did the trial court err by failing to state any grounds for 
its summary judgment determination? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 3: Although "the trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions . . . [t]he coin! shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under [Rule 56]." Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Short, 1999 UT 73, P10 (Utah 
1999) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)) (emphasis added). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 3: This issue was preserved below in Kevin 
Kendall's Objection to "Judgment and Order." (R. 135-136.) 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 4: As a matter of law, based on the deemed admissions, 
should the trial court have been required to grant Defendant's/Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Based on Deemed Admissions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 4: Summary judgment is 
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appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "An appellate court 
reviews a [lower] court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jones & Trevor Mktg. v. 
Lowiy, 2012 UT 39, P9 (Utah 2012) (quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, H 6, 177 P.3d 
600 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c) provides that "any matter admitted under this rule is 
conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of 
the admission." The court may permit withdrawal or amendment only "on motion" and 
only "if the presentation of the merits of the action will be promoted and withdrawal or 
amendment will not prejudice the requesting party." Id. Where a party makes no effort to 
have the admissions amended or withdrawn, "ftjhe trial court does not have discretion to 
unilaterally disregard the admissions." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 
1060 (Utah 1988) (emphasis in original); see also Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., 702 P.2d 
98, 100 (Utah 1985); Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Utah 1985); Kotterv. 
Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, 639-640 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). Where a party does not make 
proper independent efforts to excuse itself from the effects of Rule 36, the matters 
contained in the request for admissions "are conclusively deemed admitted." Whitaker, 
699 P.2d at 687. "Since Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by default, are 
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conclusive as to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary judgment 
stage." Carney v. IRS (In re Carney). 258 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. Tex. 2001). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 4: This issue was preserved below in 
Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
118-119), Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Deemed 
Admissions (R. 69-70), and in his Objection to "Judgment and Order." (R. 135-136.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 36. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an Order and Judgment of the Second District Court, entered 
on May 9,2012 pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff/Appellee 
Discover Bank, an FDIC insured Delaware State Bank (hereinafter "Discover Bank" or 
"Plaintiff or "Appellee"). 
Under Utah law, when a party fails to respond to requests for admissions within 
twenty-eight (28) days of service, the matters at issue are deemed admitted as fact and are 
conclusively established unless the court upon motion permits withdrawal or amendment 
of the admission. If the party against whom the admissions are admitted fails to move to 
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withdraw or amend the admissions, the court may not unilaterally disregard such 
admissions. 
Where Appellee failed to respond to Appellant's Requests for Admission and other 
discovery by the requisite twenty-eight-day deadline established by Utah R. Civ. P. 36, 
the matters contained within Appellant's Requests for Admission were therefore deemed 
admitted. However, two and a half months beyond the discovery deadline and after 
Appellant had filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellee filed belated denials of 
the admissions and also filed its own Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellee 
never moved to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions as required by Rule 36(c). 
Notwithstanding, the trial court unilaterally disregarded Appellee's deemed admissions 
and granted summary judgment for Appellee. Under Utah law, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment was improper based on the deemed admissions which have not been 
withdrawn or amended. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Discover Bank has not sought to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions; there is no 
such motion before the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
On May 9, 2012, the trial court entered a Judgment and Order in favor of Discover 
Bank, and certified the Summary Judgment rulings as final and appealable pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 28,2011, Appellee Discover Bank filed a lawsuit asserting 
claims against Appellee Kevin E. Kendall as having defaulted on a credit card balance. 
(R.2.) 
2. Appellant filed an answer in December, 2011. (R. 13-14.) 
3. On December 6,2011, Appellant served his First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Admission, and Requests for Production of Documents ("Discovery 
Requests") to Appellee. (R. 16.) 
4. Among the requested admissions was Request for Admission No. 4, which 
asked Appellee to "[a]dmit that Kevin E. Kendall has paid off the account that you allege 
[he] owe[s] money on, and that he has fulfilled all of his contractual obligations to you." 
(R. 125.) 
5. Appellant did not receive any response by the time the requisite twenty-eight 
(28) days expired on or about January 3, 2012. (R. 63.) Under operation of Utah R. Civ. 
P. 36, therefore, the admissions were deemed admitted. (R. 63-64.) 
6. While not required to do so, on or about January 25, 2012, Appellant sent a 
letter to the Appellee asking Appellee to respond to Appellant's Discovery Requests 
within ten (10) days. (R. 35 and 59.) 
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7. Receiving no response to the letter or a subsequent Motion to Compel (R. 31-
32), on February 22, 2012, Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon 
Deemed Admissions. (R. 60.) 
8. Appellee never moved to amend or withdraw its deemed admissions, as 
required by Rule 36(c). Instead, on or about March 13,2012, well after the twenty-eight 
(28) days required by law had expired, and after Appellant filed his motion for summary 
judgment, Appellee filed a response to Appellant's initial discovery requests denying the 
admissions. (R. 88.) 
9. In addition, Appellee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which stated only: "The Defendants' Motion is moot. 
The Plaintiff has sent its discovery responses to counsel for the Defendant on this date. 
Therefore, there is no relief for the Court to grant and the Motion should be dismissed." 
(R. 86.) 
10. Concurrent with its responses to discovery requests and its response to 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Appellee filed its own Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 13, 2012. (R. 89.) 
11. On March 23, 2012, the Appellant filed his Reply Memorandum in Support 
of his Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 112.) 
12. On March 29, 2012 Appellant filed his Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 119.) 
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13. The Appellee did not file a Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but filed a Notice to Submit on May 4, 2012. (R. 129.) 
14. Accompanying its Notice to Submit, Appellee also submitted a Judgment and 
Order, which was executed by the Second District Court, granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the amount of $20,601.76, on May 8,2012 and entered on May 9, 
2012. (R. 138-139.) 
15. Appellant objected to the Judgment and Order in a timely manner on May 7, 
2012. (R. 135-136.) 
16. The Judgment and Order was entered without a hearing or any ruling or other 
memoranda, such as grounds for the determination, findings of fact or conclusions of law, 
to help the parties understand why the Court was granting Appellee's Motion and 
disregarding Appellant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 135-136.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Appellee, as there were 
facts on record, based on deemed admissions that were never amended or withdrawn, that 
directly contradicted the court's summary judgment decision. To this date, there has not 
been any motion by Appellee to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions, and, as such, 
the deemed admissions are conclusively established, and merit summary judgment in 
favor of Appellant rather than Appellee. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ADMISSIONS WERE DEEMED CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED 
UNDER RULE 36(C) WHEN APPELLEE FAILED TO RESPOND 
WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED 28-DAY PERIOD. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 36(a) (2011), a party may serve upon 
any other party "a written request to admit the truth of any discoverable matter set forth in 
the request." The request "shall notify the responding party that the matters will be 
deemed admitted unless the party responds within 28 days after service of the request." 
Id. "The matter is admitted unless, within 28 days after service of the request, the 
responding party serves upon the requesting party a written response.59 Utah R. Civ. P. 
36(b). Once a matter is admitted under this rule, it is "conclusively established unless the 
court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." Utah R. Civ. P. 
36(c) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Langeland that: 
[T]he policy behind rule 36 is to facilitate and expedite the discovery 
process by allowing parties to obtain admissions as to certain undisputed 
matters and thus avoid the effort and expense of having to conduct 
discovery as to those matters. The penalty provided in rule 36(b), 
automatically admitting and establishing requests not responded to within 
thirty days, was conceived as a means of preventing abuse of the discovery 
process and facilitating the smooth administration of justice. Requests for 
admission must be taken seriously, and answers or objections must be 
seized promptly. The penalty for delay or abuse is intentionally harsh, and 
partieS'whorfaiiJ tocomply}withthe'procedural requirements of ride36 -
should not lightly escape the consequences of the rule. 
952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). The Langeland Court strongly 
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castigated a party who ignored requests for admissions for months, despite reminders that 
replies were outstanding, and only sought to withdraw and amend its deemed admissions 
after a motion for summary judgment was filed. Id. at 1064. The Court noted that 
Litigation must come to an end sometime, and the rules of procedure are 
intended to provide an orderly schedule for moving cases along their track 
to conclusion... Consequently, the court will not come to the rescue of a 
party who flagrantly ignores these rules at the expense of a party who 
attempts to conform with them. 
Id. Ultimately, the Court held, "having failed to satisfy the rule 36(b) prerequisites to the 
trial court's discretion to grant leave to withdraw or amend the admissions, the offender 
must live with the consequences of its actions." Id. 
In Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., the defendant responded to the plaintiffs request 
for admissions three months after the request was served by delivering the responses to 
plaintiffs counsel at the hearing on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 702 P.2d 
98,100 (Utah 1985). Since the defendant had never applied to the trial court for an 
extension of time to serve the answers, objected to the form of the request for admissions, 
or asked for a protective order, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that late filing of the 
answers was not excused, and the matters contained in the request for admissions were 
conclusively deemed admitted. Id. 
Similarly, in Barnes v. Clarksoru the Utah Court of Appeals found that where 
plaintiff did not respond to defendant's requests for admissions until three weeks after the 
agreed-upon deadline, despite an extension of time beyond the usual thirty days for 
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response, the requests for admission were deemed admitted. 178 P.3d 930, 931 (Utah Ct. 
App.2008). 
The situation in the case at hand is substantially similar to Langeland, Jensen, and 
Barnes. Appellant served its Requests for Admissions on December 6,2011 (R. 16). 
Pursuant to Rule 36(a), Appellant's Requests notified Appellee that Appellee's answers 
were due "within thirty (30) days from the date of service" 1 and that should the Appellee 
fail to deny any of the Requests for Admissions, they would be "deemed admitted 
pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" (R 122). The requisite 28 days 
expired on January 3, 2012 without a response from Appellee, and the admissions were 
therefore deemed admitted. Just as in Langeland, Appellant sent Appellee a letter urging 
Appellee to respond to discovery requests and reminding Appellee that the admissions 
were deemed admitted (R. 35 and 59). Like the Langeland defendant, Appellee still 
ignored the admissions requests until after Appellant filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 22, 2012 more than two months after the expiration of the response 
due date. And like the defendant in Jensen, Appellee never applied to the trial court for an 
extension of time to serve the answers, never objected to the form of the request for 
1 The 30-day response period was prescribed in the version of Rule 36 effective 
November 1, 1999 to November 1, 2011. As amended effective November 1, 2011, Rule 
36 provides that matters will be deemed admitted unless the"party responds wiffi^ 
eight (28) days after service of the request. While the 2011 amendment applies to this 
case, the extra two days provided in Appellant's notice to Appellee are inconsequential, 
since they work only to Appellee's benefit, and Appellee long exceeded the response 
period in any event. 
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admissions, and never asked for a protective order. Appellee simply ignored Appellant's 
request for more than three months. Under Rule 36(b), therefore, Appellee's admissions 
were deemed admitted. 
II. WHERE APPELLEE DID NOT MOVE TO AMEND OR WITHDRAW 
ITS ADMISSIONS, SUCH ADMISSIONS WERE DEEMED 
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
TREATED AS SUCH BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Rule 36(c), formerly rule 36(b), provides that "any matter admitted under this rule 
is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment 
of the admission." (emphasis added). The court may permit withdrawal or amendment 
only "on motion" and only "if the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
promoted and withdrawal or amendment will not prejudice the requesting party." Id. 
Where a party makes no effort to have the admissions amended or withdrawn, 
"ft]he trial court does not have discretion to unilaterally disregard the admissions." Id. at 
1060 (emphasis in original); see also Jensen, 702 P.2d at 100; Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 
P.2d 685, 686-87 (Utah 1985); Kotter v. Kotter. 206 P.3d 633, 639-640 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009). Where a party does not make proper independent efforts to excuse itself from the 
effects of Rule 36, the matters contained in the request for admissions "are conclusively 
deemed admitted." Whitaker, 699 P.2d at 687. Similarly, where a party makes "no effort 
—to have the admissions amended or withdrawn.^ 
evidence on [the] issue," the court will not engage in further analysis but will find the 
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admissions "conclusively established and legally binding.55 Kotter, 206 P.3d at 640; see 
also W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Village, 568 P.2d 734, 736-737 (Utah 1977) 
(holding that where defendant made no motion to withdraw or amend admissions but 
merely submitted an affidavit supporting its belated denial of admissions, the matters 
deemed admitted were conclusively established). 
If a motion to withdraw or amend deemed admissions is made and a trial court 
makes a determination regarding the same, an appeals court reviews that decision below 
by engaging in a two-step analysis, "what might be called a 'conditional' discretionary 
standard.55 Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d at 1060. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Langeland stated: 
In the first step, we review the trial court's determinations as to whether 
amendment or withdrawal would serve the presentation of the merits and 
whether amendment or withdrawal would result in prejudice to the 
nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's discretion 
to grant or deny the motion. The trial court has discretion to deny a motion 
to amend, but its discretion to grant such a motion comes into play only 
after the preliminary requirements are satisfied [Bjecause the rule does 
not give the trial court discretion to disregard the preliminary conditions of 
rule 36(b), its judgment as to whether those conditions have been satisfied 
is subject to a somewhat more exacting standard of review. 
Id. at 1061-62. The Court further explained the first step by giving another two-part test 
to determine whether presentation of the merits of an action would be served by 
amendment or withdrawal. The -party-seekingamendmentor withdrawal must: - _ 
(1) show that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the 
merits of the underlying cause of action, and 
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(2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts 
indicating that the matters deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue. 
Id at 1062. If the party seeking amendment or withdrawal fails to satisfy the requirements 
of this test, the nonmoving party is relieved of the burden of showing that he would suffer 
prejudice as a result of the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. Id. at 1063. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Langeland established that the burden of proving the 
truth or falsity of admissions falls on the party moving for amendment, and added, 
the time to deny admissions is within thirty days of receiving the request for 
admissions. Once these matters have been admitted against a party, 
something more than a bare denial is required to convince the court that the 
admissions should be withdrawn or amended and that the merits of the 
matter should be argued in court. 
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that an analysis under the conditional discretionary standard put 
forward in Langeland is not even reached until a motion to withdraw or amend is filed. 
The court does not have any discretion until a motion to withdraw or amend is before the 
court. 
In the case at hand, Appellee never moved to withdraw or amend its admissions. 
Instead, Appellee merely filed its denial of the admissions seventy (70) days after the 
deadline, along with its own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a three-sentence 
response to-Appellant-s Motionfor-Summary-Judgment,- whichassertedbaldly that:-uThe-
Defendants' Motion is moot. The Plaintiff has sent its discovery responses to counsel for 
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the Defendant on this date. Therefore, there is no relief for the Court to grant and the 
Motion should be dismissed." 
Appellee's response is as incorrect as it is inadequate. Once the deadline to file 
responses to a request for admissions—30 days under the old Rule 36, and 28 days under 
the new Rule—had passed, the matters were deemed admitted, and Appellee should have 
filed a motion to amend or withdraw if it desired to deny the admissions. Since Appellee 
did not file such a motion, the trial court had no discretion to unilaterally disregard the 
admissions and should have taken them into account in its summary judgment decision. 
Although Appellee did file late responses to the request for admissions and later 
filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment presenting additional evidence, this was not 
the same as a motion to amend or withdraw. With the Plaintiff having not fulfilled the 
preliminary requirements of Rule 36(c), the trial court did not have the discretion to 
ignore the deemed admissions in its summary judgment determination or to somehow 
treat Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as a motion to withdraw. See GTE 
Directories Corp. v. McCartney, 11 Fed. Appx. 735, 737 (9th Cir. Cal. 2001) (stating that 
"Rule 36(b) provides the exclusive remedy for withdrawal or amendment of admissions, 
and it provides that a court may do so 'on motion,'" and that "introduction of allegedly 
contradictory evidence cannot serve as an 'implied9 motion to withdraw."). 
Even if this Court somehow found that the trial court had the discretion to treat a 
Motion for Summary Judgment as an implied Motion to Withdraw or Amend Deemed 
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Admissions, Appellee/Petitioner still has not met the preliminary conditions of Rule 36(b) 
(showing that "the presentation of the merits of the action will be promoted and 
withdrawal or amendment will not prejudice the requesting party") and the trial court did 
not make any factual findings or conclusions of law accordingly. 
As in Kotter and Gardner, Appellee's late responses to the request for admission 
"merely present additional evidence on the issue" but do not amount to a motion to amend 
or withdraw the admissions, Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment made no attempt 
to show that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the 
underlying cause of action, or to introduce evidence of specific facts indicating that the 
matters deemed against it are in fact untrue. In fact, Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment failed to respond to the deemed admissions at all, let alone show that 
withdrawal of the admissions would serve the presentation of the case on the merits. 
Having thus failed, Appellee relieved Appellant of the burden of showing that he would 
suffer prejudice as a result of the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. Therefore 
the court would not have had discretion to grant (1) any supposed implied motion to 
withdraw, or (2) unilaterally disregard the admissions and grant Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The admissions were conclusively established and legally binding, 
and the trial court should have treated them as such. 
\ 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS UNILATERIAL DISREGARD OF 
DEEMED ADMISSIONS IN MAKING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DETERMINATION AND IN NOT STATING GROUNDS FOR ITS 
DECISION. 
Despite the Appellee's failure to file a motion to amend or withdraw admissions, 
the trial court unilaterally disregarded the deemed admissions and Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in order to grant Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Appellant's Request for Admission No. 4 asked Appellee to admit that Appellant had 
paid off the account and fulfilled all of his contractual obligations to Appellee. Where 
this Request for Admission was deemed admitted, the conclusive fact was that Appellant 
had paid off his account and fulfilled all of his contractual obligations to Appellee. 
Accordingly, Appellee could not prove any breach of contract by the Appellant or any 
damages unless or until the deemed admission was withdrawn or amended. See Eleopulos 
v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 145 P.3d 1157,1159 (Utah App. 2006) (holding that a 
breach of contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which is 
damages.); Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). Since Appellee 
could not prove a breach of contract by Appellant or any damages, grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Appellee was inappropriate. 
Additionally, the trial court entered the Judgment and Order without a hearing, a 
ruling, grounds, or any memoranda such as findings of fact 
Although "the trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
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on motions . . . [t]he court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted under [Rule 56]." Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Short, 
1999 UT 73, PIO (Utah 1999) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). No such ground was given 
in the trial court's Judgment and Order (R. 138-39). Such unilateral action, in disregard 
of the provisions of Rules 36, 52, 56 and the case law governing deemed admissions, 
constitutes error. 
IV. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED 
ON THE DEEMED ADMISSIONS. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). 
The treatment of Federal Rule 36(b) is both logical and persuasive and 
lends insight to the case at bar. 
Since Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by default, are conclusive as 
to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary judgment 
stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary 
judgment record . . . Instead, the proper course for a litigant that wishes to 
avoid the consequences of failing to timely respond to Rule 36 requests for 
admission is to move the court to amend or withdraw the default admissions 
in accordance with the standard outlined in Rule 36(b). 
Carney v. IRS fin re Carney), 258 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. Tex. 2001) (emphasis added). 
It has been conclusively established by Admission No. 4 that Appellant has paid 
off his account and fulfilled all of his contractual obligations to Appellee. Without a 
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motion to withdraw or amend this admission before the court, there can therefore be no 
genuine issue of material fact on the subject. Appellee is therefore unable to prove its 
allegations of a breach of contract by Appellant. The admissions on file are an appropriate 
basis for granting summary judgment. It is too late for Appellee to file a motion to 
withdraw or amend the deemed admissions since the litigation has reached the summary 
judgment stage. 
Litigation must come to an end sometime, and the rules of procedure are 
intended to provide an orderly schedule for moving cases along their track 
to conclusion—not to squander legal, judicial, and financial resources by 
generating lawsuits within lawsuits to determine whether the rules must 
actually be followed. Consequently, the court will not come to the rescue of 
a party who flagrantly ignores these rules at the expense of a party who 
attempts to conform with them. 
Langeland. 952 P.2d at 1064. 
The lower court denied Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment2 solely based 
on the grant of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Where the grant of Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was improper, the denial of Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be reversed. Instead, given the conclusively established facts 
of the deemed admissions, summary judgment should be awarded in favor of Appellant. 
2 The lower court did not deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (June 21, 
2012; see Court Docket) until after Defendant had filed this appeal (June 7, 2012; see R. 
144-145). From a procedural standpoint, this m ^ e s l ^ 
lower court's denial of that motion is not part of the record submitted to this Court. 
Appellant respectfully requests that if the case is remanded to the lower court for further 
proceedings, that this Court provide direction to the lower court and/or to the parties as to 
how to handle this procedural issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee was in unilateral disregard of 
deemed admissions and is therefore unfounded. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Appellee should be summarily reversed, and summary 
judgment granted in favor of the Appellant. 
DATED and SIGNED this J>_ day of November 2012. 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
Mb^Miles LeBaron 
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ADDENDUM 
Applicable Rules 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 36. Request for Admission 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a written request to 
admit the truth of any discoverable matter set forth in the request, including the genuineness of 
any document. The matter must relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of 
law to fact. Each matter shall be separately stated and numbered. A copy of the document shall 
be served with the request unless it has already been furnished or made available for inspection 
and copying. The request shall notify the responding party that the matters will be deemed 
admitted unless the party responds within 28 days after service of the request. 
(b) Answer or objection. 
(b)(1) The matter is admitted unless, within 28 days after service of the request, the 
responding party serves upon the requesting party a written response. 
(b)(2) The answering party shall restate each request before responding to it. Unless the 
answering party objects to a matter, the party must admit or deny the matter or state in detail 
the reasons why the party cannot truthfully admit or deny. A party may identify the part of a 
matter which is true and deny the rest. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the request. 
Lack of information is not a reason for failure to admit or deny unless, after reasonable 
inquiry, the information known or reasonably available is insufficient to enable an admission 
or denial. A party who considers the subject of a request for admission to be a genuine issue 
for trial may not object on that ground alone but may, subject to Rule 37(f), deny the matter 
or state the reasons for the failure to admit or deny. 
(b)(3) If the party objects to a matter, the party shall state the reasons for the objection. 
Any reason not stated is waived unless excused by the court for good cause. The party shall 
admit or deny any part of a matter that is not objectionable. It is not grounds for objection 
that the truth of a matter is a genuine issue for trial. 
(c) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established 
unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. The court may 
permit withdrawal or amendment if the presentation of the merits of the action will be promoted 
and withdrawal or amendment will not prejudice the requesting party. Any admission under this 
rule is for the purpose of the pending action only. It is not an admission for any other purpose, 
nor may it be used in any other action. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52. Findings by the court; correction of the record. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court 
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds 
of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56. Summary Judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
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Brent G.Messel, (11082) 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPT 
Discover Bank, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Kevin E Kendall, an individual, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No: 110707987 
Judge: Morris 
Pursuant to Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the above-entitled case came on 
for decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. In the Motion, Plaintiff requested that 
the Court enter judgment in the amount of $17,503.17, plus interest at the contract rate of 17.24% 
per year from 5/31/11, until judgment is entered, and then at the judgment rate until the judgment is 
paid. The Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiff Discover Bank is awarded judgment against said Defendant Kevin E 
Kendall, as requested in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, in the amount of: 
Principal: 
Accrued interest: 
Accrued Costs of Court: 
Payments: 
$17,503.17 
$2,678.59 (1) 
$420.00 
$ 
TotalJudgment: $20,601.76 
(1) interest calculated® 17.24% per annum from 5/31/11 -4/19/12. 
With interest on the total judgment at 2.12% per annum as allowed by law from the date of 
Judgment until paid. 
DATED this day of 2012. 
BY THE COURT 
Morris 
^ — » -Cftfp 
jg" Co y^ ^**Lf) \ 
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